Ian R. Turner
Assistant Professor of Political Science
Yale University


Contact Information
Yale University
Department of Political Science
P.O. Box 208301
New Haven, CT 06520-8301

E-mail: ian.turner@yale.edu
Office: A103, ISPS, 77 Prospect Street

I am an Assistant Professor of Political Science, a Resident Fellow in the Institution of Social and Policy Studies and the Center for the Study of American Politics, and a Faculty Affiliate of the Leitner Program in International and Comparative Political Economy at Yale University. Prior to joining the Yale faculty I was an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Co-director of the Political Institutions/Political Behavior Research Program at Texas A&M University. I received my PhD in Political Science from Washington University in St. Louis, where I was a fellow in the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program (2011-2014) and a graduate associate for the Center for Empirical Research in the Law (CERL).

My research focuses primarily on American political institutions and democratic accountability. I am currently working on topics in bureaucratic politics, including the role that oversight institutions play in structuring multiple dimensions of policymaking behavior. In particular, my work examines interactions within the executive branch as well as between the executive branch and other institutions. Another major project studies how interest group lobbying and campaign finance structures policymaking incentives, informational dynamics, and political agendas. I am also generally interested in political economy, formal political theory, and issues in public administration and management.

For more information on my work check out my CV, the papers listed below, or my SSRN page.


Peer-Reviewed Publications

  • "Legislative Capacity and Credit Risk," (with David Fortunato). Forthcoming. American Journal of Political Science.
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation         Supporting Information         Dataverse    

  • "Allies or Commitment Devices? A Model of Appointments to the Federal Reserve," (with Keith Schnakenberg and Alicia Uribe). 2017. Economics & Politics 29(2): 118-132.
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation    

  • "Working Smart and Hard? Agency Effort, Judicial Review, and Policy Precision." 2017. Journal of Theoretical Politics 29(1): 69-96.
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation    

Working Papers

  • "Political Agency, Oversight, and Bias: The Instrumental Value of Politicized Policymaking." R&R at Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation    

  • "Ex Post Review and Expert Policymaking: When Does Oversight Reduce Accountability?" (with John W. Patty). R&R at Journal of Politics.
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation    

  • "Helping Friends or Influencing Foes: Electoral and Policy Effects of Campaign Finance Contributions," (with Keith E. Schnakenberg). R&R at American Political Science Review.
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation    

  • "Signaling with Reform: How the Threat of Corruption Prevents Informed Policymaking," (with Keith E. Schnakenberg). R&R at American Political Science Review.
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation         Supplemental Appendix    

  • "Reviewing Procedure vs. Judging Substance: The Scope of Review and Bureaucratic Policymaking.'' Under review.
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation    

Book Chapters


Yale University

Texas A&M University

  • Game Theoretic Methods in Political Science (Undergraduate, Fall 2015, Fall 2016)


  • Formal Models of Bureaucracy (Graduate, Spring 2016)


  • Political Institutions (Graduate, Summer 2016)


Washington University in St. Louis

  • American Politics (Undergraduate, Summer 2014)