Ian R. Turner
Assistant Professor of Political Science
Yale University


Contact Information
Yale University
Department of Political Science
P.O. Box 208301
New Haven, CT 06520-8301

E-mail: ian.turner@yale.edu
Office: Rm. 134, Rosenkranz Hall

Office Hours: Schedule Appointment Here

I am an Assistant Professor of Political Science, a Resident Fellow in the Institution of Social and Policy Studies and the Center for the Study of American Politics, and a Faculty Affiliate of the Leitner Program in International and Comparative Political Economy at Yale University. Prior to joining the Yale faculty I was an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Co-director of the Political Institutions/Political Behavior Research Program at Texas A&M University. I received my PhD in Political Science from Washington University in St. Louis, where I was a fellow in the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program (2011-2014) and a graduate associate for the Center for Empirical Research in the Law (CERL).

I am broadly interested in American politics, political institutions, political economy, formal political theory, and issues in public administration, management, and policy. My research focuses primarily on political institutions and democratic accountability and representation. Currently, I am working on projects using applied formal modeling to study various topics in bureaucratic politics and special interest politics (lobbying and campaign finance). For more information on my work check out my CV and the papers listed below.

If you would like to schedule a meeting with me during my office hours click the link at the top of the page to reserve a time slot (please do not exceed two 15 minute blocs).


Published & forthcoming

  • "Motivated Reasoning and Democratic Accountability" (with Andrew T. Little and Keith E. Schnakenberg). Forthcoming. American Political Science Review.
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation         Ungated    

  • "Reviewing Procedure vs. Judging Substance: How Increasing Bureaucratic Oversight Can Reduce Bureaucratic Accountability." 2021. Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy 2(4).
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation         Ungated    

  • "Helping Friends or Influencing Foes: Electoral and Policy Effects of Campaign Finance Contributions" (with Keith E. Schnakenberg). 2021. American Journal of Political Science 65(1): 88-100.
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation         Ungated    

  • "Ex Post Review and Expert Policymaking: When Does Oversight Reduce Accountability?" (with John W. Patty). 2021. Journal of Politics 83(1): 23-39.
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation         Ungated    

  • "Policy Durability, Agency Capacity, and Executive Unilateralism." 2020. Presidential Studies Quarterly 50(1): 40-62.
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation         Ungated    

  • "Signaling with Reform: How the Threat of Corruption Prevents Informed Policymaking" (with Keith E. Schnakenberg). 2019. American Political Science Review 113(3): 762-777.
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation         Ungated    

  • "Political Agency, Oversight, and Bias: The Instrumental Value of Politicized Policymaking." 2019. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 35(3): 544-578.
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation         Ungated    

  • "Legislative Capacity and Credit Risk" (with David Fortunato). 2018. American Journal of Political Science 62(3): 623-636.
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation         Dataverse         Ungated    

  • "Allies or Commitment Devices? A Model of Appointments to the Federal Reserve" (with Keith E. Schnakenberg and Alicia Uribe-McGuire). 2017. Economics & Politics 29(2): 118-132.
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation         Ungated    

  • "Working Smart and Hard? Agency Effort, Judicial Review, and Policy Precision." 2017. Journal of Theoretical Politics 29(1): 69-96.
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation         Ungated    

Working papers

  • "Accountability in Governing Hierarchies" (with Christopher M. Li and Greg Sasso).
        Abstract         BibTeX Citation    

  • "Formal Models of Money in Politics" (with Keith E. Schnakenberg). In preparation for Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 26 (2023).


Yale University

Texas A&M University

  • Game Theoretic Methods in Political Science (Undergraduate, Fall 2015, Fall 2016)


  • Formal Models of Bureaucracy (Graduate, Spring 2016)


  • Political Institutions (Graduate, Summer 2016)